The World Bank is a vital source of financial and technical assistance to developing countries around the world. We are not a bank in the ordinary sense but a unique partnership to reduce poverty and support development. The World Bank Group has two ambitious goals: End extreme poverty within a generation and boost shared prosperity.
- To end extreme poverty, the Bank's goal is to decrease the percentage of people living on less than $1.25 a day to no more than 3% by 2030.
- To promote shared prosperity, the goal is to promote income growth of the bottom 40% of the population in each country.
The World Bank Group comprises five institutions managed by their member countries.
The World Bank Group and Land: Working to protect the rights of existing land users and to help secure benefits for smallholder farmers
The World Bank (IBRD and IDA) interacts primarily with governments to increase agricultural productivity, strengthen land tenure policies and improve land governance. More than 90% of the World Bank’s agriculture portfolio focuses on the productivity and access to markets by small holder farmers. Ten percent of our projects focus on the governance of land tenure.
Similarly, investments by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Bank Group’s private sector arm, including those in larger scale enterprises, overwhelmingly support smallholder farmers through improved access to finance, inputs and markets, and as direct suppliers. IFC invests in environmentally and socially sustainable private enterprises in all parts of the value chain (inputs such as irrigation and fertilizers, primary production, processing, transport and storage, traders, and risk management facilities including weather/crop insurance, warehouse financing, etc
For more information, visit the World Bank Group and land and food security (https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/agriculture/brief/land-and-food-security1
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Resources
Displaying 846 - 850 of 4907Use of Catastrophe Risk Models in Assessing Sovereign Food Security for Risk Transfer
This paper discusses how catastrophe
crop risk models can be used to assess food security needs
at the sovereign level for the purpose of risk transfer. The
rationale for a system to evaluate food security needs at
the national level is discussed. The role of technology and
remote sensing data availability as an enabler of
catastrophe crop risk models is discussed followed by a
description of the framework of catastrophe crop models for
Inclusive Economic Growth in America’s Cities
This paper defines economic inclusion as
the ability of all people, including the disadvantaged, to
share in economic gains, that is, the conditions that allow
for broadly shared prosperity. Beyond the “right” to access
consumption in cities, and beyond relatively standardized
safety net policies that support economic security,
inclusion demands intentional, flexible, context-appropriate
strategies aimed at shifting the dynamics of local land and
Rate of Return Regulation and Emission Permits Trading under Uncertainty
This paper analyzes the dynamic effects
of rate-of-return regulation on firms’ emissions compliance
behavior when the price of emissions permits is uncertain.
The paper shows that uncertainty regarding the price of
permits would motivate a regulated firm to adopt a more
self-sufficient strategy and would reduce the
cost-effectiveness of emission allowance trading. When
allowance transactions are treated as capital investments,
Does Collective Action Sequester Carbon?
This paper estimate the effects of
collective action in Nepal’s community forests on four
ecological measures of forest quality. Forest user group
collective action is identified through membership in the
Nepal Community Forestry Programme, pending membership in
the program, and existence of a forest user group whose
leaders can identify the year the group was formed. This
last, broad category is important, because many community
Cooperative Behavior and Common Pool Resources
This paper examines whether cooperative
behavior by respondents measured as contributions in a
one-shot public goods game correlates with reported
pro-forest collective action behaviors. All the outcomes
analyzed are costly in terms of time, land, or money. The
study finds significant evidence that more cooperative
individuals (or those who believe their group members will
cooperate) engage in collective action behaviors that