It is a well-known fact that households in developing countries often undergo weather-related and other shocks that drastically affect incomes. A large and growing literature explores the effectiveness of response to these events. One strand of the literature addresses the strategies that households and governments use to protect against income shocks (Udry 1990; Fafchamps, Udry, and Czukas 1998; Kochar 1999). A second strand looks at the effectiveness of these strategies in reducing fluctuations in consumption.

Despite substantial economic liberalization since the early 1990s, nontraditional exports in Zambia have grown only moderately and agricultural performance overall has been disappointing. Though agriculture accounts for less than 20 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), it is the most important source of employment, especially for women. Interpretations of Zambia’s poor performance variously emphasize external factors, such as declining copper prices and vulnerability to weather shocks, and market imperfections.

Reduction of rural poverty is one of the greatest challenges the Government of Nepal faces. Since most of the country’s agricultural production is semi-subsistence-oriented, increased commercialization of this rural-based economy is essential for poverty reduction and economic growth. Consequently, farm output diversification and productivity improvements are high-priority areas for the government.

Micronutrient malnutrition is a serious problem in developing countries. It is well established that micronutrient requirements are greater for women and children because of their special needs for reproduction and growth. Unfortunately, however, women and children suffer most from micronutrient deficiencies. Micronutrient deficiency impairs the cognitive development of young children, retards physical growth, increases child mortality, and contributes to the problem of maternal death during childbirth.

The early work on intrahousehold allocation alerted researchers and policymakers to the possible policy failures that could arise from neglect of intrahousehold allocation issues (Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman 1997). Conversely, what are the policy gains from paying attention to these issues? The new research on intrahousehold issues provides evidence that policies and interventions can be made more effective when differential rights, resources, and responsibilities within the household are explicitly considered.

The bargaining power of men and women crucially shapes the resource allocation decisions households make (Quisumbing and de la Brière 2000). Husbands and wives often use their bargaining power to express different priorities about how resources should be allocated. Understanding these differences and their effects is critical if policymakers are to improve livelihoods. Increasing the bargaining power of one gender group rather than another can mean the difference between policy failure and policy success.

Traditional models of household economic behavior have portrayed households as unified entities. They assume that household members agree about decisions and share resources in the most equitable way possible. More recently, however, economists have come to view households as domains of difference, where multiple decisionmakers may have different preferences and, in many cases, control separate sets of resources. This new approach has greatly improved understanding of household resource allocation behavior.

One in every three preschool-aged children living in developing countries is malnourished. This disturbing yet preventable state of affairs causes untold suffering and, given its wide scale, is a major obstacle to the development process itself. Volumes have been written about the causes of child malnutrition and the actions that can be taken to reduce it— ranging from community-based feeding programs to accelerated economic growth (Smith and Haddad 2000).

Policymakers have many options for improving women’s status relative to men’s. The most appropriate set of actions in a given situation will naturally be specific to that context. This chapter outlines some policy actions that have proven successful, as summarized in Table 26.1, and gives some examples of their implementation.

Agrowing body of literature suggests that men and women allocate resources under their control in systematically different ways.

This chapter challenges one of the main tenets of agricultural economics—that households behave as though they are single individuals, with production factors allocated efficiently between men and women. In many contexts this is a convenient and innocuous assumption. It can be quite restrictive, however, when investigating the causes and welfare consequences of gender differences in agriculture.

Much empirical work has approached the problem of how resource allocations are made within households from the perspective that if preferences differ, welfare outcomes depend on the power of individuals to exert their own preferences. Measures of power are therefore a central component of quantitative empirical approaches to understanding how different preferences translate into different welfare outcomes. Following most of the empirical studies in this genre, this chapter focuses on dynamics within couples.