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Bibliothèque Externalities, Decreasing Returns, and Common Ownership

Externalities, Decreasing Returns, and Common Ownership

Externalities, Decreasing Returns, and Common Ownership

Resource information

Date of publication
Décembre 2001
Resource Language
ISBN / Resource ID
AGRIS:US2016208963

Placing production units under common ownership is often suggested as a solution to the problem of externalities. This will not always be true when there are decreasing returns to scale. An atomistic industry could be more efficient than a monopoly in some instances. Even when the "optimal" industry configuration would involve a finite number of producers, no two may have appropriate incentives to combine. An omniscient and benign regulator can always assure a more efficient outcome than would result from the combination of private producers. Whether real-world regulators should be called upon, however, is less clear.

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Authors and Publishers

Author(s), editor(s), contributor(s)

Simpson, R. David

Publisher(s)
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