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Biblioteca Reverse-share-tenancy and Marshallian Inefficiency

Reverse-share-tenancy and Marshallian Inefficiency

Reverse-share-tenancy and Marshallian Inefficiency

Resource information

Date of publication
Dezembro 2012
ISBN / Resource ID
127558
Pages
48 pages

While there are ample empirical studies that claim the potential disincentive effects of sharecropping arrangements, the existing literature is shallow in explaining why share tenancy contracts are prevalent and diffusing in many developing countries. Using a unique tenant-landlord matched dataset from the Tigray region of Ethiopia, we are able to show how the tenants’ strategic response to the varying economic and tenure-security status of the landlords can explain sharecroppers’ productivity differentials.

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Authors and Publishers

Author(s), editor(s), contributor(s)

Hagos, Hosaena Ghebru
Holden, Stein

Geographical focus