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Degradation of common pool resource (CPR) in developing countries has often been traced to high rate attached by poor people in discounting future flow of benefits, market failure, pressure on carrying capacity or sometimes property right failure. However, the concept of poorly enforced property right and particularly risk of eviction as a measure of insecurity of land tenure has not been adequately examined in the context of degradation of CPR. A game theoretic framework is developed where degradation of forest grazing land is explained in terms of changes in perceived risk of eviction from the encroached land. Logit regression is applied to empirically analyse the impact of perceived fear of reduced access and other variables on the state of degradation. For this purpose, a sample of seven villages is considered in tribal dominated region in West Bengal, India. It is observed that apart from a number of socio-economic variables like poverty, mutual trust and other incomes, perceived fear of eviction (represented as a dummy variable) arising from insecurity of forest land tenure, has a significant impact on forest degradation status in the study region.
