When collective action and tenure allocations collide: Outcomes from community forests in Quintana Roo, Mexico and Petén, Guatemala | Land Portal

Resource information

Date of publication: 
December 2011
Resource Language: 
ISBN / Resource ID: 
AGRIS:US201500217145
Pages: 
343-352

Based on a comparative case study of four community forestry enterprises in Guatemala and Mexico, we examine the relationship between user group characteristics and state allocation of tenure bundles. Using Schlager and Ostrom's four levels of tenure bundles and collective action theory, we illustrate how tenure bundles and collective action costs interact to either promote or create disincentives for conservation and communal economic benefits. We suggest that in communities with high costs for collective action, a tenure bundle that includes management, withdrawal and exclusion rights yet omits alienation rights may be optimal for community forestry. We also demonstrate how unclear allocation of rights can result in local interpretations of land rights that do support collective action.

Authors and Publishers

Author(s), editor(s), contributor(s): 

Barsimantov, James
Racelis, Alex
Biedenweg, Kelly
DiGiano, Maria

Publisher(s): 

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